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ABSTRACT
User-generated web content is rife with abusive language that can
harm others and discourage participation. Thus, a primary research
aim is to develop abuse detection systems that can be used to alert
and support human moderators of online communities. Such sys-
tems are notoriously hard to develop and evaluate. Even when they
appear to achieve satisfactory performance on current evaluation
metrics, they may fail in practice on new data. This is partly be-
cause datasets commonly used in this field suffer from selection
bias, and consequently, existing supervised models overrely on cue
words such as group identifiers (e.g., gay and black) which are not
inherently abusive. Although there are attempts to mitigate this
bias, current evaluation metrics do not adequately quantify their
progress. In this work, we introduce Adversarial Attacks against
Abuse (AAA), a new evaluation strategy and associated metric that
better captures a model’s performance on certain classes of hard-
to-classify microposts, and for example penalises systems which
are biased on low-level lexical features. It does so by adversarially
modifying the model developer’s training and test data to generate
plausible test samples dynamically. We make AAA available as an
easy-to-use tool, and show its effectiveness in error analysis by
comparing the AAA performance of several state-of-the-art mod-
els on multiple datasets. This work will inform the development




• Social and professional topics → Hate speech; • General
and reference → Evaluation; • Networks → Online social net-
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Web is full of abusive language, from hate speech and racist
or sexist stereotypes to targeted cyberbullying and profane insults
[22]. Since the volume of new posts is unmanageable for human
moderators, there is an unquestionable need for reliable automatic
techniques that help to keep the online space safe. The ability to
detect and quantify abuse is also important in itself for web science,
for example, to be able to research questions about what kind of
content attracts hateful discourse [26]. This makes abuse detection
an important task for Natural Language Processing (NLP).
To address the problem researchers have employed various heuris-
tics to upsample the abusive messages in order to make it possible
to train and evaluate supervised systems. Among the problems
that make the development of abuse detection systems hard is the
unsuitableness of the available automatic evaluation tools. It is stan-
dard practice to report F1 scores achieved on held-out data and/or
on existing published datasets, but this strategy is likely to give
systems unrealistically high scores. It has been shown that datasets
that are commonly in use in the field show strong biases towards
certain words or topics [25], partly as a result of the sampling strat-
egy used to obtain a sufficient number of abusive posts. As a result
of this, classifiers learn to exploit said bias. For example, the well-
known dataset of Waseem and Hovy [23] features tweets discussing
whether women are suitable as football commentators. This results
in words such as commentator and football being strong hate cues
in the dataset, harming the generalisability and increasing the rate
of false positives1. Wiegand et al. [25] showed that classification
scores on popular datasets reported in previous works are much
lower under realistic, less biased settings.
1In the context of binary abuse detection, the abusive class is regarded as the positive
class.
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Although the evaluation of a system on different datasets might
help in assessing its ability to generalise, there is no guarantee
that continuing to use only static datasets for benchmarking will
actually help in detecting data-specific biases or assessing whether
the model’s capability to detect abuse is robust, leaving researchers
with no clues about what the weaknesses of their systems are.
Furthermore, it is rarely the case that a suitable resource is available.
This is because abuse detection datasets are very context-dependent,
due to their focus on different subtypes of harmful content (e.g.,
sexism/racism, hate speech/offensive language) and platforms (e.g.,
Twitter, Wikipedia).
Our approach makes progress on these issues, by providing a
more comprehensive evaluation of abuse detection systems. Specif-
ically,
(1) we introduce a set of techniques to adversarially modify
examples. The generated new examples are harder to classify,
especially for systems that rely on dataset bias, but they are
still plausible. They retain the lexical material of the original
text, and we maintain full control of the output label. Our
attacks cover categories that were previously absent in the
literature, such as the transformation of abusive texts into
non-abusive ones.
(2) We define Adversarial Attacks against Abuse (AAA), an eval-
uation strategy and associated metric for abuse detection
systems. AAA measures the performance of a system on
the examples that have been dynamically generated from
the model developer’s training and test data. It adapts to a
wide range of toxic microposts (e.g., abusive, racist, hateful)
and domains. We make the AAA tool2 publicly available so
that researchers can easily evaluate models on the dataset
of interest.
(3) We empirically evaluate state-of-the-art architectures with
the AAA score, showing that even systems which are specif-
ically meant to address the bias issue are in fact not very
resilient to it.
2 RELATEDWORK
We use abuse as an umbrella term covering any kind of harmful
content on the Web, as this is accepted practice in the field [19, 22].
Abuse detection is plagued by a number of problems, and as a
consequence, systems are hard to develop and evaluate. Human
annotators are notoriously unreliable at deciding whether or not a
given social media post is hateful [14]. There is considerable ambi-
guity in definitions and a variety of overlapping related concepts
[22]. Despite the amount of effort that goes into creating them,
existing datasets are often limited to certain subtypes of abusive
language (such as racism and sexism), and the sampling strate-
gies used to obtain abusive microposts from social media are far
from ideal because they can lead to selection bias [25]. This makes
evaluation challenging.
Researchers have started to combine the introduction of new
models with a qualitative inspection of the model’s behaviour and
explicit attempts to mitigate the effects of known biases on it. For
example, Mozafari et al. [12] introduced a BERT-based model [5]
fine-tuned for the abuse detection task and reported astonishing F1
2https://github.com/Ago3/Adversifier
scores on theWaseem et al. [24] and Davidson et al. [4] datasets, but
they at the same time recognised how such performance wasmainly
due to the system’s ability to model data bias. Kennedy et al. [9]
and Zhang et al. [27] demonstrated how hate speech classifiers tend
to systematically produce false positives when an input sentence
contains group identifiers, such as “gay” or “black”. This is due to the
fact that models are not able to detect hateful statements as humans
would (understanding the message as a whole) and focus, instead,
on specific shallow features of the training set. As a partial solution,
Kennedy et al. [9] proposed the use of a post-hoc regularization
technique, called Sampling and Occlusion [8, SOC]. This technique
allows reducing the importance given by a model to a set of group
identifiers, to give more importance to more generalisable features.
However, this approach is only able to make models more receptive
to general features, but not to understand the context and the use of
language. We will demonstrate this in Section 5 with experiments
tailored to probe the ability of a model to identify when a message
is used in a derogatory way or when it contains just a mention of a
hateful message.
One of the first attempts to study the robustness of abuse de-
tection systems through the use of perturbations or modifications
of input text was performed by Gröndahl et al. [7]. In this work
the authors showed how the injection of adversarial attacks (i.e.,
perturbations of input posts) can cause huge performance drops in
detection systems. In particular, they experimented with the inser-
tion of typos, changes in word boundaries and with the addition
of 10 to 50 non-hateful words to posts labelled as abusive. Words
to be appended were selected among common English words and
words that were “common” among the non-abusive posts contained
in the dataset. Although the attacks are very effective, the modi-
fications often resulted in posts that are too artificial (e.g., when
appending 10 to 50 words to short posts like tweets), making their
usefulness as an evaluation tool questionable. Moreover, none of the
described attacks involve changes in the ground truth label of posts,
and they therefore fail to detect important weaknesses in current
state-of-the-art models. A very popular approach to the creation of
adversarial attacks for text classification was presented by Wallace
et al. [20], but it is of limited interest for an evaluation tool as a)
its “triggers” are often gibberish for humans b) it is concerned with
malicious attacks to a model rather than with the robust evaluation
of inputs that could have been plausibly produced by a human c) it
assumes white-box access to the model weights.
A further step towards a fairer but still automatic evaluation of
models is HateCheck [15], a benchmark of 29 functionality tests
for the detection of hateful content. The 29 tests were motivated
by findings in previous research and interviews with civil society
stakeholders, and were designed starting from a fixed set of group
identifiers and slurs. Since HateCheck is a static benchmark, re-
searchers who wish to use it to evaluate their models would have
to perform non-trivial changes to adapt the tests to their domain
of interest (e.g., by skipping tests related to demographic groups
that are out of their scope). More importantly, the static nature
of HateCheck prevents it from penalising dataset-specific biases,
making very promising tests such as counterspeech detection (i.e.,
identification of references to harmful messages that seek to act
against them) less effective. Instead of evaluating a system in a
static environment that might not meet the needs of researchers,
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or measuring its capability to handle very artificial posts, there
is a need for an approach that combines the dynamic nature of
adversarial attacks [7] with the more “natural” style of handcrafted
examples [15].
3 AAA: A NEW EVALUATION METRIC FOR
ABUSE DETECTION SYSTEMS
In this work, we introduce AAA, a new evaluation metric for abuse
detection systems meant to complement the information provided
by the F1-score on standard datasets, by evaluating systems in hard
scenarios, built starting from the training and test sets. This ap-
proach has two main advantages. First, AAA is not tied to a fixed
definition of what “abusive content” is, and is hence suitable for the
evaluation of a wide range of models for the detection of toxic (e.g.,
abusive, racist, hateful) textual microposts. Second, it tailors the
definition of “hard examples” to the dataset in use and adapts itself,
for instance, to avoid rewarding a system for modelling selection
biases in the datasets, and for exhibiting overamplification phe-
nomena [17, selection bias, overamplification]. We achieve this by
defining grey-box adversarial attacks (see Section 3.1), and compute
the AAA score as a system’s performances in such scenarios (see
Section 3.2).
3.1 Attacks
We define an attack as a tuple (𝑓 , 𝑐, 𝑐 ′) where 𝑓 is a function that
takes as input a text 𝑡 belonging to class 𝑐 and returns the perturbed
text 𝑓 (𝑡), and 𝑐 ′ is the ground truth class of 𝑓 (𝑡). All our attacks
are grey-box, meaning that while we do not assume access to the
model’s gradient, we still require access to the training set. This
enables us to adapt the definition of hard-to-classify posts to the
dataset in use. In particular, the attacks are designed to fulfil the
following criteria:
C.1 𝑓 (𝑡) is harder to classify correctly than the original post, es-
pecially for systems that overrely on the biases found within
the training set.
C.2 𝑓 (𝑡) is still a plausible post (i.e., not too artificial).
The resulting attacks are based on three characteristics that make
posts hard to classify: when the post merely mentions an abusive
message, for example to express disagreement (as part of counter-
speech) (Section 3.1.1), when the abuse is hidden in a post that is
known to be non-abusive (Section 3.1.2), and finally, when it con-
tains words that the model knows to be strongly associated with
the opposite class (Section 3.1.3).
3.1.1 Flipping the Label: Abusive to Non-Abusive. To turn abusive
into non-abusive posts, we embed them, in quotation marks, into a
non-abusive template that merely mentions the original post, but
does not express agreement with it (the Quo𝐴→𝑁 attack). For each
abusive post, we draw a template uniformly at random. For instance,
by embedding ‘Men “have a discussion”. Women “argue”’3
into a template, we produce the non-abusive ‘Here is what she
said: “Men ‘have a discussion.’ Women ‘argue.’” Bigotry
in action.’. Our approach has several advantages: (1) it leaves
the lexical material in the original post unchanged, exploiting the
3All the examples are taken from the Waseem et al. [24] dataset. Therefore, assessing
the actual abusiveness level of the mentioned tweets is out of the scope of this work.
vulnerability of systems that overrely on shallow features such as
cue words; (2) the resulting text is plausible and (3) it adapts to any
dataset-specific definition of abusiveness.
We mined 317 templates from real tweets semi-automatically as
follows. To identify tweets that mention potentially abusive text
without expressing agreement, we retrieved a public archive of
tweets4 and filtered out all the unique English tweets that did not
contain a pair of quotation marks, obtaining around 925,000 in-
stances; then, we processed tweets by removing all quoted material
and substituting it with a special <mask> token. We manually se-
lected 5 viable templates from a sample of 5,000 tweets. The rest of
the dump was used to automatically search for candidate templates
with the help of BERTweet [13], a powerful NLP model that embeds
tweets as high-dimensional latent vectors. We use BERTweet to
encode both the seeds and the dump: each micropost is encoded
by mean pooling over all the hidden states produced by the fourth,
third and second to last layers. Then, for each tweet in the dump
we computed a relevance score as the maximum cosine similarity
between the vector of the tweet and that of each of the seeds. Three
annotators each processed 3,000 of the top 9,000 most relevant
tweets. Annotators were asked to decide whether it was clear that
the candidate template did not express agreement with the quoted
text, for all possible messages that could be embedded inside of it
– if there was a reasonable counterexample the tweet had to be
discarded. Approved tweets were lightly edited to remove sensitive
or too specific information, e.g. URLs and user handles, together
with vulgar or derogatory terms5. In a second stage each of the
annotators validated the accepted candidate templates produced
by the other two annotators. They were able to either discard or
slightly revise them. In the third and final stage a fourth annotator
validated the templates, marking each item as either valid or invalid.
Templates were found to be of high quality, with 99.4% approved.
The resulting templates feature many different varieties of English
and degrees of formality. Most express disagreement, while some
report on what was said without taking a stance.
3.1.2 Flipping the Label: Non-Abusive to Abusive. We turn non-
abusive microposts into abusive ones by combining them with ones
that are known to be abusive (the Flip𝑁→𝐴 attack). What exactly
is considered abusive depends on the definition adopted. For this
reason, we pick the abusive messages (𝑝𝑎) from the test set and
prepend it to the original post: 𝑓 (𝑡) = “𝑝𝑎 𝑡”. For instance, we turn
the non-abusive tweet ‘I have a few favourites #mkr’ into abu-
sive by prepending the abusive tweet ‘Men “have a discussion”.
Women “argue”’ to it. Since 𝑓 (𝑡) is the result of the concatena-
tion of two existing tweets, it is likely to also be a grammatical
utterance, and not too artificial (although the topics discussed in
the two components might be different). Furthermore, picking the
abusive posts from the test set makes the resulting post 𝑓 (𝑡) more
challenging for a biased system, hence fulfilling our criteria.
To assess the quality of the generated posts, we apply the Flip𝑁→𝐴
attack to the Waseem et al. [24] dataset, and ask 3 annotators to re-
view a sample of 100 instances. In particular, annotators are shown
4Downloaded from https://archive.org/details/twitterstream. Period: November 2018 -
February 2019.
5According to the Google Dictionary taxonomy (https://languages.oup.com/google-
dictionary-en/).
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the original posts (𝑝𝑎 and 𝑡 ) with their original labels (abusive and
non-abusive, respectively) and asked to verify that “𝑝𝑎 𝑡” is abusive
(e.g., 𝑡 does not express disagreement with 𝑝𝑎). As a result, 94% of
the generated posts were approved by all the annotators, and 100%
were approved by at least 2 annotators.
3.1.3 Keeping the Label Constant. To perturb posts without chang-
ing the label, we build on the word appending attack of Gröndahl
et al. [7], which involves the concatenation of 10 to 50 non-hateful
words to hateful speech, and define two new, less artificial vari-
ants. In the first, we aim to make the classification of abusive posts
harder, without changing the label of the original post (Corr𝐴→𝐴).
To this end, we create a dictionary of non-abusive expressions by
looking for common words that have a high correlation with the
non-abusive class in the training set. Gröndahl et al. [7] used corre-
lation as the only criterion for word selection, but this approach
is prone to selecting rare words. To identify words that a naive
supervised model is likely to rely on, we train a binary logistic
regression model with word-count features on the training set and
select the 100 words with the highest regression coefficients. Then,
for each test instance, we sample 𝑘 words from this dictionary (𝑘 is
drawn uniformly at random from [1, 5]), and append them to the
original abusive post in the form of hashtags. Hence, a sexist tweet
like ‘Men “have a discussion”. Women “argue”’ is changed
to the still sexist ‘Men “have a discussion”. Women “argue”
#calls’.
The second variant uses a similar technique to modify non-
abusive posts without changing their label (Corr𝑁→𝑁 ). In par-
ticular, we exploit the binary logistic regression model as described
above to create a dictionary of words that are predictive of the
abusive class. However, not every word that has a high correlation
with the abusive class can be appended to a non-abusive message
without flipping its label. Therefore, we filter out from the set of
such words any token that has an entry (after lemmatisation) in
HurtLex, a multilingual lexicon for hate speech [1], and append 𝑘
of the remaining words to the original post in the form of hash-
tags. Since current technologies are not able to perfectly tokenise
hashtag content, making it harder to detect the presence of hateful
words within hashtags, we choose to discard hashtags while build-
ing the dictionary. As an example, consider the tweet ‘I have a
few favourites #mkr #black #transgender’ obtained starting
from the non-abusive post ‘I have a few favourites #mkr’.
We assess the quality of the generated posts by applying the
Corr𝐴→𝐴 and Corr𝑁→𝑁 attacks to the Waseem et al. [24] dataset,
and asking 3 annotators to review a sample of 100 instances for each
attack. In particular, annotators are shown the original posts with
their original labels, and asked to verify that the appended hashtags
do not affect the label. As a result, 100% of the posts generated with
the Corr𝐴→𝐴 attack were approved by all the annotators, while
87% of the instances generated with the Corr𝑁→𝑁 attack were
approved (with 92% approved by at least 2 annotators). Importantly,
the higher error rate observed for the Corr𝑁→𝑁 attack is due to
the absence of the word “feminazi” in HurtLex, which in turn did
not prevent the tool from selecting it as a non-abusive hashtag.
What If Hashtags are Ignored? Appending words in the form
of hashtags allows us to freely concatenate words to the original
post 𝑡 , without making the outcome 𝑓 (𝑡) nonsensical. However,
we are aware that some models ignore hashtags, and for example
replace each occurrence with a generic token. This pre-processing
step would neutralise the effects of the Corr𝐴→𝐴 and Corr𝑁→𝑁
attacks, hence resulting in falsely high scores. To avoid rewarding
a system for the (questionable) choice of discarding hashtags, we
design a test meant solely to determine whether hashtags are being
ignored or not. More specifically, we create a copy of the test set
where each word in each post is a hashtag, by simply prepending
the symbol “#” to any non-hashtag word. For instance, the tweet
‘I have a few favourites #mkr’ becomes ‘#I #have #a
#few #favourites #mkr’. We then compare the True Positive and
Negative rates obtained by the target system on both the original
test set and the new version. If a significant (𝜒2 test, 𝑝 = 0.05) drop
in performances is found, then we assume that hashtags are being
wrongly pre-processed, and assign a score of 0 to both the Corr𝐴→𝐴
and Corr𝑁→𝑁 attacks. Guidelines about pre-processing choices are
given in Section 6.1.
3.2 Formula
Once a system has been evaluated on the dataset of interest per-
turbed by all our adversarial attacks, one at a time, we compute
the AAA score as the geometric mean of the Correct Prediction
Rates (CPRs) reported in each setting. We choose to use CPR as
the measure of performance since, in each setting, all the instances
share the same ground truth label. More specifically, the AAA score
is obtained as:
AAA = ` (Quo𝐴→𝑁 ,Corr𝑁→𝑁 , Flip𝑁→𝐴,Corr𝐴→𝐴) (1)
where ` is the geometric mean function, and any other term 𝑎 refers
to the CPR obtained when attack 𝑎 is applied.
Since each of the attacks exposes a different weakness in the
model under evaluation, AAA can penalise systems overrelying on
some data bias. But does AAA capture all the known biases in the
context of abuse detection? We used two approaches to address
this question, a literature review and a computational one.
Neural abuse detection systems are known to be over-sensitive to
group identifiers like “woman” or “black”. Dixon et al. [6] identified
the source of this bias in the disproportionate representation of iden-
tity terms in datasets, where terms like “gay” happen to occur more
frequently in abusive posts than non-abusive ones. Although none
of our attacks directly addresses this issue, models that overrely
on group identifiers would be penalised by the Corr𝑁→𝑁 attack.
In fact, dynamically building a dictionary of common words that
have a high correlation with the abusive class allows us to capture
these group identifiers (in datasets where these actually represent
an issue). When applied to the Waseem et al. [24] dataset, hashtags
like #girls, #blonde, #female and #muslim are appended to non-
abusive tweets, testing a model’s capability to correctly identify
the resulting sentence as non-abusive despite the presence of the
group identifier.
Abuse detection systems are also known to regard posts contain-
ing features associated with some dialects (e.g., African American
English) as more likely to be abusive than posts that do not contain
these features [2, 3, 16]. We acknowledge that the current version
of the AAA metric is not fully able to penalise models presenting
such bias.
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In addition, we exploited a recently introduced computational
technique for dealing with unknown biases in NLP models [18] to
check for further easy-to-spot biases that were not yet captured by
AAA, and potentially design new attacks to fill the gap. In particular,
Utama et al. [18] proposes to learn a biased version of a model
𝑀 by training 𝑀 on a sample of the training set containing 𝑁
instances for 𝑒 epochs. The parameters 𝑁 and 𝑒 are tuned so that
𝑀 achieves an accuracy score of 60-70% on the unseen training
examples, and more than 90% of 𝑀’s predictions are in the high
confidence bin. We follow this procedure using the BERT-based
system introduced by Mozafari et al. [12] (namely, BERT𝑀𝑂𝑍 ),
since the authors themselves suggested using their model as a tool
to spot the presence of biases in a dataset. As for the data, we
choose the widely-used Waseem et al. [24] dataset and split it into
training, validation and test sets according to the 80%/10%/10% rule,
while keeping the distribution of the labels equal in each split. We
find the two conditions above to be satisfied when BERT𝑀𝑂𝑍 is
trained for 5 epochs on 1,500 samples. Then we manually checked
the predictions of the model on the unseen training examples, but
we were unable to find evidence of biases besides the ones already
discussed in this section.
4 EVALUATION SETUP
4.1 Datasets
We experiment with the widely-used Waseem and Hovy [23] (Wa-
seem) and Davidson et al. [4] (Davidson) datasets. For Waseem, we
follow Waseem et al. [24] and merge the examples from [23] and
[21], obtaining 19,639 unique tweets annotated with the classes
“sexism” (4,115), “racism” (2,061), “neither” (13,417) and “both” (46).
When evaluating with AAA, we map the “sexism”, “racism” and
“both” classes to the abusive one, and regard “neither” as non-
abusive. The Davidson dataset focuses on a different concept of
abuse, and contains 24,783 tweets labelled as “hate speech” (1,430),
“offensive” (19,190) and “neither” (4,163). At testing time, we map
all instances labelled as “hate speech” or “offensive” to the abusive
class and consider the remaining instances as non-abusive. For both
Waseem and Davidson, we use stratified sampling to split 0.8, 0.1,
and 0.1 portions of tweets from each class into training, validation
and test sets. For the sake of replicability, we release the ids of the
examples in each split for both datasets.
4.2 Models
The first baseline that we use is the BERT-based model presented
in [9] (BERTKEN). This architecture is composed of the fine-tuned
BERTBASE followed by a fully connected neural network without a
hidden layer, and is trained using a regularization technique meant
to reduce the bias on group identifiers. Since an analogous archi-
tecture had already been proposed in [12], but with no attempts to
mitigate modelling the bias, we decided to add a re-implementation
of this model as a comparison system (BERTMOZ). Finally, we in-
clude the results for an SVM model with bag-of-words features,
since such simple architecture has been shown to obtain promising
results.
We did not re-implement the BERTKEN model, but used the code
(and parameters) made available by the authors6.
We train our implementation of BERTMOZ using the same pa-
rameter values as in [12]. More specifically, we train the classifier
with a dropout probability of 0.1 and use the Adam optimiser [10]
with a learning rate of 2e-5. We increase the number of training
epochs to 20, and register the best performance on the validation
set (w.r.t the F1 score) after 9 epochs for Waseem (batch size 32),
and 18 for Davidson (batch size 16).
As for the SVM model, we exploit word count features, use a
linear kernel and set the regularization parameter to 1.
We adopt the same pre-processing procedure for both theWa-
seem and Davidson datasets, and replace usernames, URLs and num-
bers with special tokens. Wemark hashtags using the special tokens
⟨hashtag⟩ and ⟨/hashtag⟩, and tokenise their content using the
TweetTokenizer provided within the NLTK library. All punctua-
tion marks are replaced with spaces, and posts are converted to
lower case.
5 EVALUATION RESULTS
Our experiments highlight critical weaknesses in current state-of-
the-art classifiers (Section 5.1) and demonstrate AAA’s capability
to penalise models that are biased on low-level lexical features
(Section 5.2). We show that existing models exhibit alarmingly low
performance in recognising speech that only quotes abusive lan-
guage, and highlight the importance of testing models dynamically
(Section 5.3).
5.1 How Do State-of-the-Art Models Perform
on AAA?
The results achieved by the SVM, BERTMOZ and BERTKEN models
on the Waseem and Davidson datasets are shown in Table 1. The
first column group (delimited by ||) contains the micro-F1 scores
achieved by the models on the original dataset. Although this
is a binary classification setting, we show micro-averaged scores
because this reflects standard practice in the field, where, as a
consequence of averaging over multiple classes, performance on the
non-abusive class is regarded as equally important as performance
on any other class. On Waseem all the models under study achieve
high (> 82%) F1-scores. For the SVM and BERTMOZ models such
scores are mainly the result of the systems’ ability to detect non-
abusive posts, with True Negative Rates (TNRs) above 91% and
True Positive Rates (TPRs) below 70%. BERTKEN exhibits a different
behaviour, achieving comparable performances on the two classes
(TPR ≈ TNR ≈ 82). Since BERTKEN is optimised to reduce the
number of false positives by reducing the importance of some
group identifiers such as hate cues, one might expect it to achieve a
higher TNR than the non-debiased equivalent (BERTMOZ). This is
not what we observe in our experiments: on the contrary, BERTKEN
has a ∼ 9 percentage points lower TNR, and a ∼ 15% points higher
TPR than BERTMOZ. This suggests that the optimisation technique
employed to reduce bias towards group identifiers might have the
collateral effect of increasing the importance of other low-level
6https://github.com/BrendanKennedy/contextualizing-hate-speech-models-with-
explanations
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Dataset Model F1 Non-Abusive (TNR) Abusive (TPR) AAA
Original Original Quo𝐴→𝑁 Corr𝑁→𝑁 Original Flip𝑁→𝐴 Corr𝐴→𝐴
SVM 82.18 95.01 51.93 59.46 54.50 45.53 33.28 46.51
Waseem BERTMOZ 84.42 91.58 35.21 60.28 68.97 61.85 51.29 50.94
BERTKEN 82.18 82.19 19.61 40.01 82.15 74.14 73.63 45.50
SVM 91.81 88.73 9.65 51.80 92.43 79.14 54.03 38.24
Davidson BERTMOZ 95.76 89.45 4.12 41.49 97.04 96.88 95.59 35.47
BERTKEN 94.39 73.86 1.21 26.86 98.55 99.28 97.87 23.72
Table 1: Results achieved on the AAA attacks by the SVM, the finetuned BERTBASE model (BERTMOZ), and the finetuned
BERTBASE model optimised to reduce bias towards group identifiers (BERTKEN) on the respective dataset. The four column
groups (delimited by | |) contain, from left to right, themicro F1-scores on the original dataset, the True Negative Rate (TNR) on
the original dataset and on the non-abusive examples generated by our attacks, the True Positive Rate (TPR) on the original
dataset and on the abusive examples generated by our attacks, and the AAA scores. All scores are reported as percentages
(higher is better).
Original Hashtag
Model TNR TPR TNR TPR AAA
SVM 95.01 54.50 99.25 12.86 46.44
BERTMOZ 91.58 68.97 93.14 45.50 51.00
BERTKEN 82.19 82.15 71.01 78.46 45.50
BERTMOZ-NH 87.18 74.92 100.00 00.00† 0.00
Table 2: The True Negative and True Positive rates for the hashtag check, and the AAA scores, achieved by the SVM, the
finetuned BERTBASE model (BERTMOZ), the finetuned BERTBASE model optimised to reduce bias towards group identifiers
(BERTKEN), and the variant of BERTMOZ that fully discards hashtags (BERTMOZ-NH). Results are shown for theWaseemdataset
(Original), and a variant of the dataset where each word is turned into an hashtag (Hashtag). All scores are reported as per-
centages. †: statistically different from the corresponding score on the Original setting (𝜒2 test, 𝑝 = 0.05).
lexical features that characterise the abusive class within the dataset,
but less precisely (i.e., causing more false positives).
The second column group in Table 1 shows the models’ TNRs
on the hard non-abusive examples generated by the Quo𝐴→𝑁 and
Corr𝑁→𝑁 attacks. Discrimination of harmful content from coun-
terspeech is shown to be remarkably hard for state-of-the-art mod-
els, with the best model (SVM) performing just above random.
Importantly, the SVM achieves a TPR of 54.50% on the original
dataset, showing that the “high” performance on the Quo𝐴→𝑁 set-
ting is mainly due to its inability to recognise abusive posts in the
first place. Overall, our experiments demonstrate that state-of-the-
art models are not able to judge the abusiveness of a post within
the context it appears in. Even a simple perturbation such as the
addition of a few hashtags to the original post is very challeng-
ing for the studied models, with SVM and BERTMOZ achieving
a TNR of ∼ 60%. BERTKEN is systematically at least ∼ 15 points
below the other models in both the scenarios, supporting our con-
jecture around the collateral effects of the employed optimisation
technique.
The third column group in Table 1 reports the TPRs achieved
on the hard abusive examples generated by the Flip𝑁→𝐴 and
Corr𝐴→𝐴 attacks. Our experiments show the SVM model to be
the most sensitive to these attacks, which is consistent with its
higher TNR on the original dataset and its tendency to assigning
higher importance to features predictive of the non-abusive class
(i.e., the features exploited by the Flip𝑁→𝐴 and Corr𝐴→𝐴 attacks).
BERTMOZ achieves a TPR of ∼ 51% on the Corr𝐴→𝐴 setting, while
it is more robust to the Flip𝑁→𝐴 attack, on which it registers a
decrease of only ∼ 7 points compared with its TPR on the original
Waseem dataset. Contrary towhat was observed for the non-abusive
class, BERTKEN scores at least 15 points above the other models on
both scenarios. However, the decrease observed on the Flip𝑁→𝐴
setting (compared with the original dataset) is comparable to the
one registered by the SVM and BERTMOZ models. The robustness
of BERTKEN to the Corr𝐴→𝐴 attack is less surprising when consid-
ering that it achieves the lowest TNR on the original dataset (see
also the results of the SVM model).
Overall, AAA scores (shown in the fourth column group in
Table 1) are very low, with BERTMOZ being the top-ranked model
with a score of 51.00% (a random classifier would achieve a AAA
score of 50.00%). The SVM and BERTKEN models achieve similar
scores, obtaining AAA scores of 46.44% and 45.50%, respectively.
The results discussed thus far equally apply to our experiments
on the Davidson dataset (see second row group in Table 1). Scores
in the Quo𝐴→𝑁 scenario are strikingly low, with TNRs ranging
from ∼ 9% for the SVM model to ∼ 1% for BERTKEN. This is not
surprising if considering that TPRs on the original Davidson dataset
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are extremely high (> 92%) (and remarkably higher than the corre-
sponding scores onWaseem). In fact, these systems are so reliant
on low-level lexical features in the abusive posts in the dataset that
they fail to recognise when such posts are inserted in a non-abusive
context. In contrast, adding non-abusive cues to abusive posts has
limited effects on the decisions made by the models, thus resulting
in high TPRs in the Flip𝑁→𝐴 and Corr𝐴→𝐴 scenarios.
Finally, we test whether the hashtag check (Section 3.1.3) works
as intended and penalises models that ignore hashtags. All the
experiments discussed above were run using a pre-processing pro-
cedure that does not discard hashtags: this is correctly recognised
by the hashtag check (see Table 2), which therefore does not ap-
ply a penalty. When testing a system that fully discards hashtags
(BERTMOZ-NH), the drop in performance becomes significant, and
the model is assigned a AAA score of 0%.
5.2 Does AAA Penalise Biased Models?
AAA is designed to penalise models that overrely on group identi-
fiers when making predictions, within the Corr𝑁→𝑁 setting. At a
first glance, this does not seem to be confirmed by our experiments:
BERTKEN, a model explicitly optimised not to overrely on some
group identifiers, is the most sensitive to the attack. Assuming a
pass/fail threshold of 60%, BERTKEN does not pass the test, while
the non-debiased variant of the same model (BERTMOZ) does. How-
ever, we recall that the Corr𝑁→𝑁 attack exploits non-rare words
that are relevant for the abusive class, hence including, but not
limited to, group identifiers. The low TNR achieved by BERTKEN in
this setting suggests that the technique used to reduce bias towards
group identifiers might have the collateral effect of increasing the
importance of other low-level lexical features that characterise the
abusive class (see also Section 5.1).
To test this, we evaluate the three models with a variant of
Corr𝑁→𝑁 that only exploits the 25 group identifiers used for the
debiasing of BERTKEN (Ident𝑁→𝑁 ). In such a setting, the improve-
ment of BERTKEN over BERTMOZ becomes evident, confirming that
the low TNR in the Corr𝑁→𝑁 scenario must be due to other un-
known biases tackled by this attack. Interestingly, neither BERTKEN
nor BERTMOZ passes the test onWaseem. When evaluated on the
HateCheck functional tests for group identifiers [15, F18,F19], two
static sets of examples containing neutral (Ident-Neutral) and posi-
tive (Ident-Neutral) statements about some demographics, BERTKEN
is the top-ranked model, but BERTMOZ, whose bias on group iden-
tifiers is known, does not fail the test either. This highlights the
importance of dynamic evaluation tools such as AAA.
Among the models, the overall AAA score for BERTKEN is the
lowest on both the Waseem and Davidson datasets. This is because,
by testing on hard examples for both classes, and by dynamically
tailoring the definition of hard to the dataset in use, AAA is actually
able to measure the overall improvement of a model and BERTKEN
is not awarded a better score for moving the bias problem from
some group identifiers to other low-level features.
5.3 Detection of Counterspeech
Counterspeech is speech that directly counters hate, for example by
presenting facts, pointing out hypocrisy or reacting with humour or,
sometimes, open hostility [11]. Despite its educational importance,
counterspeech is often misclassified by existing abuse detection
models, in particular when it contains quotes from the addressed
harmful message. Misclassification of counterspeech was the most
mentioned issue in the interviews with civil society stakeholders
conducted in Röttger et al. [15], and the resulting increase in false
positive rates represents a cause of concern for the workload of
human content moderators at social media platforms. Since most of
the posts in the Quo𝐴→𝑁 attack express their disagreement with
the original post, the attack effectively generates examples of coun-
terspeech from the input data and thereby tests a model’s capability
to discriminate this type of counterspeech from harmful messages.
Assuming a pass/fail threshold of 60%, none of the models passes
this test on either of the datasets. Table 3b summarises the results for
the models trained on the Waseem dataset. In contrast, all the mod-
els perform well on the existing tests for counterspeech detection
accuracy in the HateCheck test suite [15, F20,F21] (Counter-Quote)
and (Counter-Ref ). This indicates that the score on the Quo𝐴→𝑁
component can serve as a useful measure to evaluate a model’s
ability to distinguish counterspeech from abusive language.
6 DISCUSSION
The results show that existing state-of-the-art models still perform
poorly at distinguishing abusive from non-abusive language in
various challenging scenarios. While we aimed for the generated
posts to be hard to classify, they are not artificial examples that
would only appear if an attacker were to try intentionally to fool
the model; instead, the microposts were carefully designed to be
plausible.
The strategies that are traditionally used to evaluate the models
do not show this. This is particularly noticeable in the Quo𝐴→𝑁 at-
tack. Despite the excitement around the ability of BERT and related
attention-based models that dominate the field, such state-of-the-
art models still fail when the speaker repeats a hateful message
merely to state their disagreement with it. The models that ap-
parently perform better here are those that were more likely to
misclassify the original sentence in the first place, which suggests
that their supposedly correct classification of the hard-to-classify
post is really the combination of two mistakes. Clearly, there is
much work left to do.
6.1 Guidelines for Future Research
In AAA, we introduce an easy-to-use tool that allows the developers
of systems for the detection of abusive microposts to evaluate their
systems against certain classes of hard-to-classify microposts. Users
are simply required to merge all the abusive (non-abusive) classes
into a single positive (negative) class. The tool will then build hard
examples starting from the training and test sets, and query the
model under evaluation in a black-box manner (see Figure 1).
AAA is designed as a diagnostic tool that complements the infor-
mation provided by the F1-score on standard datasets. We intend for
it to be used in error analysis. A good practice for future research in
this area is to report both the F1 and AAA scores. Since each AAA
component tackles a different weakness in a model’s behaviour,
reporting all 4 subscores would give a much clearer picture of a clas-
sifier’s flaws. When summarising a model’s performance in a single
score is necessary, for example in competitions with leaderboards,
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(a) Group Identifiers
Model Corr𝑁→𝑁 Ident𝑁→𝑁 Ident-Neutral Ident-Pos
TNR O TNR O TNR O TNR O
SVM 59.46 ✗ 79.73 ✓ 85.71 ✓ 86.24 ✓
BERTMOZ 60.28 ✓ 50.00 ✗ 96.83 ✓ 89.95 ✓
BERTKEN 40.01 ✗ 56.86 ✗ 100.00 ✓ 99.47 ✓
(b) Counterspeech
Model Quo𝐴→𝑁 Counter-Quote Counter-Ref
TNR O TNR O TNR O
SVM 51.61 ✗ 91.91 ✓ 87.23 ✓
BERTMOZ 35.37 ✗ 92.49 ✓ 95.74 ✓
BERTKEN 19.61 ✗ 90.75 ✓ 85.82 ✓
Table 3: The TrueNegative Rate achieved by the SVM, the finetunedBERTBASE model (BERTMOZ), and the finetunedBERTBASE
model optimised to reduce bias towards group identifiers (BERTKEN). Results are reported for: (a) our Corr𝑁→𝑁 attack applied
to the Waseem dataset, a variant of this attack restricted to group identifiers (Ident𝑁→𝑁 ), and the corresponding functional
tests in HateCheck [15, F18,F19] (Ident-Neutral and Ident-Pos); (b) our Quo𝐴→𝑁 attack applied to the Waseem dataset, and
the corresponding functional tests in HateCheck [15, F20,F21] (Counter-Quote and Counter-Ref ). All scores are reported as













- #I #have #a #few #favourites #mkr
- #Men #have #a #discussion. #Women #argue.
Original - I have a few favourites #mkr
- Men "have a discussion". Women "argue".
- Here is what she said:  "Men "have a discussion."
Women "argue.""  Bigotry in action.
- Men "have a discussion." Women "argue." I have
a few favourites #mkr
- Men "have a discussion." Women "argue." #calls









Figure 1: The AAA tool builds hard examples starting from the input training and test sets, and after checking whether the
model under evaluation discards hashtag content, aggregates the scores on the Quo𝐴→𝑁 , Flip𝑁→𝐴, Corr𝐴→𝐴 and Corr𝑁→𝑁
scenarios.
we suggest to report the geometric mean of the F1 and the 4 AAA
sub-scores. When instead this necessity arises from a researcher’s
need to decide for a parameter setting over another, or for a de-
sign choice over another, we would advise choosing between the
configurations on the Pareto frontier over the five scores.
Although AAA does not come with a pre-defined pre-processing
procedure, leaving researchers with full freedom to design their
own, researchers should be aware that some choices might be less
suitable than others. In particular, we invite researchers to not fully
discard the content of hashtags, since this would affect the efficacy
of the Corr𝐴→𝐴 and Corr𝑁→𝑁 attacks. Models that discard hashtag
content are identified by our framework and assigned a score of 0
for the settings corresponding to the mentioned attacks (instead of
falsely high scores) (see Section 3.1.3).
Given the importance of distinguishing hate speech from coun-
terspeech [15], which is the focus of our Quo𝐴→𝑁 attack, researchers
maywish to not remove quotationmarks. If punctuation is removed,
we suggest replacing it with spaces instead of removing it entirely.
The main reason for this is that often social media posts are not well-
typed, and tweets like ‘THIS is why I find the “antifeminist
women just want male attention” argument moronic...as
if there aren’t better ways to get that.’ would other-
wise give rise to words like moronicas. Although we expect such
artefacts to have low frequency within the dataset, it might be the
case that some of these are selected for the Corr𝑁→𝑁 attack, and
not properly filtered due to the lack of a corresponding entry in
HurtLex.
6.2 Limitations
AAA is designed to work for many related NLP tasks such as the
detection of abusive language, hate speech, sexism, and racism, but
there are a few exceptions inwhich the Quo𝐴→𝑁 will not achieve its
intended effect of flipping the label. First, since the original quoted
material may contain offensive language, AAA is unsuitable for
use in situations where offensive words should never be used, not
even when reproaching someone else for using them. Second, many
of the templates express disagreement with the quoted material,
sometimes in the form of a personal attack directed at the abuser
(such as calling them ignorant, bigoted, or stupid). Therefore, AAA
may not be suitable for use in situations when any kind of insult
is considered abusive, although care was taken that the templates
never use vulgar or obscene language.
AAA tests models for many of the biases that abusive language
detection models are known for. One exception is that it does not
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fully test a model’s ability to predict the abusiveness of a post re-
gardless of the dialect it is written in (Section 3.2). This is because,
due to the level of reliability of current technologies for style trans-
fer, it would be impossible to automatically change the style of a
post and still be able to construct clear gold labels.
The AAA metric has been designed as an evaluation metric for
English datasets. The Flip𝑁→𝐴 , Corr𝐴→𝐴 and Corr𝑁→𝑁 attacks
can be used on datasets written in any language, although a suitable
lexicon for Corr𝑁→𝑁 is needed. To fully enable the use of AAA
on non-English datasets, researchers would need to create new
templates for the Quo𝐴→𝑁 attack in the target language, following
the methodology described in Section 3.1.1.
The AAA metric could be less reliable on datasets where user-
related information is provided. For instance, a post containing
reclaimed slurs might see its label change depending on the demo-
graphic information concerning the author and the target of the
post. The Corr𝐴→𝐴 and Corr𝑁→𝑁 attacks could fail at selecting,
respectively, non-abusive and abusive words from the training set.
To the best of our knowledge, this issue does not concern existing
datasets, but it might become relevant in the future.
Finally, datasets containing non-textual information (e.g., images,
videos, audio recordings), or long textual posts, are out of the scope
of this work.
6.3 Ethical Statement
There are ethical implications to consider in connection to this
research. The Quo𝐴→𝑁 attack relies on a collection of templates
based on public tweets (Section 3.1.1) that we release together with
the AAA tool. In order to comply with Twitter’s policies, we discard
any information about the authors, anonymise any user mention
with @user, replace the quoted text, (usually most of the tweet
content) with 〈tweet〉, and remove any URL, full name, topic-
specific term or strong offence from the post. It might be the case
that some templates can still be mapped to the original tweets (and
hence users) on the Twitter platform, but the only information
deducible from the templates is that the corresponding authors
have once quoted and potentially expressed their disagreement
about something.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have shown various strategies to adversarially
modify existing abuse detection evaluation examples, in order to
challenge existing automatic classification approaches. We have
applied our method to popular abuse detection datasets, and demon-
strated that none of the tested classifiers manages to achieve good
performances on it. Thus, we introduced AAA, an evaluation metric
that complements the information contained within the F1-score
obtained on held-out datasets by aggregating performance on the
adversarial scenarios. We encourage the community to evaluate
future abuse detection approaches with our challenging metric,
which requires on the part of the automatic system a more thor-
ough understanding of the text than what is currently the case. It
remains to be seen if optimising for AAA (i.e., applying the AAA
tool on the validation set at the model selection and hyperparam-
eters tuning phase) might have unintended consequences on the
effectiveness of AAA at testing time. We leave this open question
for future work.
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